

Problem Set 4

Problem 1.

Show that the Nash bargaining solution satisfies the IUU property.

Problem 2.

Find the ESS in the game below (Hawk-Dove with different payoffs, notice that Hawk-Hawk gives negative payoffs to both players).

	Dove	Hawk
Dove	$\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}$	0, 1
Hawk	1, 0	$-\frac{1}{4}, -\frac{1}{4}$

Problem 3. Consider the following coalitional game:

$N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$; $v(S) = 1$ if S contains either $\{2, 3, 4\}$ or $\{1, i\}$, and $v(S) = 0$ otherwise.

In other words, it's like a simple majority game, where player 1's vote counts as 2 votes.

- a) Show that the core of this game is empty.
- b) Find the Shapley value of this game.

Problem 4.

Find the Egalitarian, Utilitarian, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Nash solution to the following bargaining problem: $(U: \{u_2 \leq 12 - 4u_1 \text{ and } u_2 \leq 6 - u_1\}, u^* = 0)$, as represented on the graph below.

